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SELF-EXECUTING EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: A
SEPARATION OF POWERS PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution provides that treaties between the
United States and foreign nations be made by the President with
the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.' Since 1817,2 presi-
dents have utilized an alternate type of international agreement,
known as the executive agreement, in foreign affairs transactions. The
executive agreement has been defined by the State Department as an
international agreement made by the President on behalf of the
United States without resort to the treaty process outlined in the
Constitution.3 This Comment will consider the legal problems caused
by self-executing executive agreements which do not have congres-
sional sanction.4 Such agreements, although relatively rare, by defini-
tion become part of our domestic law,5 and their conclusion by the
President appears to be an encroachment upon Congress' legislative
domain. Moreover, recent discussion of the possibility of removing
trade barriers between the United States and the People's Republic
of China through self-executing executive agreements6 compels one
to give this type of agreement close examination.
Since discussion of the executive agreement has most often oc-
curred in a highly charged political atmosphere, 7 the commentaries
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
2. See S. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 85-86 (1904);
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 428 n.24 (1972).
3. Proposed Amendment to Foreign Affairs Manual § 721.2(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 22084
(1973).
4. There are executive agreements made pursuant to or in accordance with exist-
ing legislation or treaty, and those which are made subject to congressional approval or
implementation. Dep't of State Circular No. 175, (Dec. 13, 1955), reprinted in W.
BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (3d ed. 1971).
5. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 141-44 (1965).
6. Comment, Blocked Assets and Private Claims 3 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 449,
453-54 (1973). The Litvinov Agreement, mentioned in the above cited comment as
an example of the type of agreemennt contemplated with China, is a self-executing
agreement. See notes 48-51 infra & accompanying text.
7. The famous McDougal-Lans analysis of the executive agreement, McDougal
& Lans, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945), was moti-
vated by the fear that the new United Nations would suffer the same fate in the Senate
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have generally been more rhetorical than analytical. However, funda-
mental issues lurk in the background of every discussion of the execu-
tive agreement. Before analyzing such agreements, one must first
substantiate the proposition that the President may make interna-
tional agreements without resort to the treaty process. If this proposi-
tion is invalid, it means that substantial alteration of United States
foreign policy practice would be necessary. If this proposition is valid,
one must ascertain whether there are qualifications attached to the
presidential power to make executive agreements, and if so, what they
are. This Comment will establish that, as a matter of domestic law,
the President may make international agreements other than treaties.
Further, it will describe and evaluate the various approaches which
have been used to ascertain the origin and nature of the qualifica-
tions limiting presidential power to make self-executing executive
agreements.
I. "TREATY?"
The basic issue which goes to the very core of our governmental
structure is whether the President may make an international agree-
ment on behalf of the United States without resort to the treaty
process outlined in the Constitution. Thus, the essential question is
a constitutional one of defining the powers of the executive. The Con-
stitution itself gives the President the power to receive ambassadors,8
and it is this power which identifies him as our "sole organ" of offi-
cial communication with foreign states. Yet, that says nothing about
as had its Wilsonian predecessor, the League of Nations. Berger, The Presidential
Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Micr. L. Rav. 1, 37 (1972).
During the Bricker Amendment controversy in the early 1950's, the executive
agreement was the lesser target of a broad attack upon the President's authority to
make international agreements. However, at that time the real issue at stake was the
consequence of United States participation in United Nations agencies and signature
to a proposed Human Rights Covenant. Hearings on S.I. Res. I and S.J. Res. 43 Be-
fore the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1-
12, 823-27 (1953) [Hereinafter cited as Bricker Hearings]. For the text of the pro-
posed amendment, see id. at 1-3.
Again, because of the broad critique of presidential power in foreign affairs fol-
lowing the View Nam experience, (see generally Hearings on S. 596, H.R. 14365, and
H.R. 14647 Before a Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop-
ments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 (1972)) the
executive agreement has found itself the target of much criticism.
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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the instrumentalities available to the President to make international
agreements. Some scholars have assigned great weight to prior United
States practice, conceding that "it is too late for a purist insistence
upon treaties" as a mode of international agreement.9 However, repe-
tition of a practice does not necessarily mean that it conforms to the
Constitution, ° and an argument based exclusively upon prior practice
is therefore not entirely persuasive.
In fact, there are firmer grounds upon which to base a presiden-
tial power to make agreements which are not treaties. While the Con-
stitution absolutely forbids states from entering into treaties, it only
conditionally prohibits them from making international agreements."
Furthermore, nowhere does the Constitution state that the treaty is to
be the sole mode of international agreement available to the Presi-
dent. Since the Constitution does not restrict agreement-making to
the treaty process, and does recognize an alternative to the treaty in the
"[A]greement . . . with a foreign power,"' 2 the international agree-
ment which is not a treaty is available to the President as a foreign
policy instrument.
Recently, Professor Raoul Berger of Harvard challenged this con-
clusion. He argued that the "agreements" of article I, section 10 refer
exclusively to agreements between the states.' 3 It is true that the words
"agreements and compacts" were inserted into article I, section 10 so
that interstate boundary settlements would be covered;' 4 yet it is
equally clear that this was not the only meaning which the framers
gave to these words. One author has asserted that to the framers, "com-
pacts and agreements" referred to undertakings in which one party's
obligation became entirely discharged through one act.' 5 Although
this definition proves unworkable in practice, it is significant because
it shows that the framers' conception of "agreement" applied to in-
ternational as well as interstate contracts. Moreover, the wording of
9. Hearings on S. 596 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., at 26 (1971).
10. Cf. Hearings on S. 440 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., at 10 (1973) (statement of Raoul Berger, Charles Warren Senior Fel-
low, Harvard Law School).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
12. Id.
13. Berger, supra note 7, at 42.
14. See Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by
"Agreements or Compacts," 3 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 453 (1936).
15. Id. at 464.
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most of the preliminary drafts of the Constitution, as well as the final
version, refer to some variation of "agreements . . .with a foreign
power."'16 Thus, Professor Berger's interpretation of the "agreements"
of article I, section 10 is unacceptable.
Professor Berger also focused his attention upon the word "agree-
ments" in arguing that the absence of any reference to that term in
the treaty clause of article III implies a deliberate decision by the
framers to withhold the "agreement-making" power from the Presi-
dent.'7 Considering that in our government federal rule in foreign
affairs is supreme to that of the states,18 it would be rather odd for
the states to be granted an instrument of international agreement
which is denied to the federal government's "sole organ" in foreign
affairs. Therefore, one must reject the Berger argument that the inter-
national agreement which is not a treaty is unavailable to the Presi-
dent.
Finally, Professor Berger attempted to draw upon one of the con-
curring opinions in the famous Steel Seizure case of 1951, Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,' 9 in order to conclude that the
President may only use the treaty process to consummate international
transactions. The Steel Seizure decision invalidated a presidentially
ordered seizure of the nation's steel mills. One of the concurring
opinions in that decision dealt at length with separation of powers,
suggesting the existence of an area in which the President and Con-
gress shared power to act.20 However, the President could only act
in this area if Congress had not done so, and was therefore pre-empted
from acting when congressional action had conclusively covered the
subject matter in question. Professor Berger applied a somewhat analo-
gous approach to interpreting the treaty clause by arguing that the
broad definition to which the concept of "treaty" is susceptible makes
this word "cover the field" of international agreements, thus pre-
empting use of any other instrument.2' However, this argument is
not entirely persuasive. In a recent district court decision 2 2 the court
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; 2 M. FARRAND, THE RFcoans OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 169, 187, 442 (1911).
17. Berger, supra note 7, at 39-40.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; id. art. VI.
19. 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Berger, supra note 7, at 36.
20. 343 U.S. at 579, 637.
21. Berger, supra note 7, at 37.
22. Consumer's Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C.
1973).
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found that a general statute of uncertain application did not pre-
empt the exercise of presidential power to make an executive agree-
ment. Insofar as our domestic law is concerned, the lack of defini-
tion to the word "treaty" makes it fall rather neatly into the "general
and uncertain application" rubric;23 therefore, it should not be con-
strued to "cover the field" of international agreements.
Professor Berger's analysis of the executive's foreign affairs powers
is often instructive, exhibiting a rather impressive and refreshing array
of historical material. However, it does not disprove the proposition
that in making international agreements there is an alternative to the
treaty which is compatible with the Constitution.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM: VARYING
APPROACHES TO ITS SOLUTION
Once it has been established that there is an alternative to the
treaty process in consummating affairs with foreign nations, it must
be determined if there are limitations upon the presidential authority
to employ this alternative. To resolve this problem one must look
to the normal guides presented by our domestic legal system: statutes,
the Constitution, and judicial decisions. Statutory material is not help-
ful since the only law pertaining to executive agreements24 was speci-
fically drafted to avoid the general problem of qualifying the execu-
tive agreement powers.2 5 However, analysis of the Constitution and
certain judicial decisions sheds more light upon the problem.
Essentially, there are two types of constitutional qualifications to
the President's power to make executive agreements: prohibitions
which apply to all three branches of the federal government and pro-
hibitions arising from the constitutional separation of powers which
prevent the individual branches from encroaching upon each other. 2 6
Some of the prohibitions applicable to every branch arise from con-
stitutional guarantees to the states against federal encroachment. For
example, no branch of the federal government may change the nature
of state governments, nor cede their territory without their permis-
23. Id., at 1323.
24. 1 U.S.C. § 112(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
25. S. RaP. No. 591, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. at 3-5 (1972).
26. Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 23 CASE W.
REs. L. RaV. 3, 42 (1972).
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sion.27 Such limitations, therefore, apply to the President's use of the
executive agreement in foreign affairs.
The most controversial limitations have been those placed upon
federal action vis-a-vis individuals-the Bill of Rights. Controversy
about the Bill of Rights' limitations on the use of executive agree-
ments originated in great part due to two cases, Missouri v. Holland28
and United States v. Pink.29 In the Missouri case, the Supreme Court
interpreted the "supremacy clause" in order to validate a statute which
implemented the terms of a wildlife treaty between the United States
and Canada. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, paraphrased
the "supremacy clause" in dicta, and remarked that although laws
are passed pursuant to the Constitution, treaties are made "under the
authority of the United States." 30 In the Pink case, the Court validated
an executive agreement which had apparently divested foreign credi-
tors of their claims to the assets of a liquidated insurance company
in the United States. During the 1950's, proponents of the Bricker
Amendment, which was intended to curb the executive power to make
treaties and executive agreements,81 argued that Holmes' Missouri
dicta meant that treaties did not have to conform to the Constitu-
tion.32 They also pointed to the Pink decision as an example of Su-
preme Court sanction of an executive agreement which had circum-
vented normal fifth amendment guarantees.33 In 1956 the Supreme
Court, in Reid v. Covert,8 4 expressly rejected Senator Bricker's in-
terpretation of the Missouri decision. The executive agreement at is-
sue in Reid denied civilian dependents of American servicemen over-
seas the right to jury trial. The Court explained that the phrase
"under the authority of the United States" had been placed in article
VI of the Constitution so that treaties made under the Articles of
Confederation would not be invalidated. 5 Referring to both treaties
and executive agreements, the Court unequivocally stated that no in-
ternational agreement could contravene the Constitution.8 It was
27. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
28. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
29. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
30. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
31. See Bricker Hearings, supra note 7, at 1-3.
32. Id. at 6-7.
33. Id.
34. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
35. Id. at 16.
36. Id.
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quite apparent that the Court's decision was a direct reply to Senator
Bricker's interpretations of Missouri and Pink;37 in effect, the Court
reaffirmed the applicability of Bill of Rights limitations to treaties
and executive agreements.
However, neither the courts nor Congress have dealt with the
separation of powers problem presented by the paradox of a Presi-
dent making legislation through self-executing executive agreements.
The Constitution divides power between branches in an affirmative
fashion, telling them which powers they have, not which powers they
do not have.88 This makes the separation of powers problem difficult
because restrictions upon the executive arising from separation of
powers are implicit rather than explicit.
During the 20th century there have been some notable attempts
to resolve this problem. Theodore Roosevelt's "stewardship" theory
proposed that the executive was empowered to do anything not speci-
fically prohibited in the Constitution. 9 Although this theory provided
a rationalization for some of Roosevelt's actions, such as a contro-
versial executive agreement with Santo Domingo, 40 it did not really
respond to the separation of powers problem because it did not take
into account implicit constitutional limitations upon the executive.
During the early 1920's, in the wake of the defeat of the Versailles
Treaty, Quincy Wright published a prizewinning treatise-The Con-
trol of Foreign Relations.41 Wright was well aware of problems en-
gendered by separation of powers recognizing that there were areas
in which presidential and congressional powers overlapped. His only
answer to the problem, however, was to appeal for "constitutional
understandings" between branches.4 Finally, during the 1930's the
Supreme Court approached the separation of powers problem in its
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.43 decision, and im-
37. The Court has not dealt with Senator Bricker's interpretation of Pink. How-
ever, a careful reading of the Pink opinion will indicate that Senator Bricker merely
misread the case. In the course of its opinion in Pink, the Court explicitly stated that
fifth amendment guarantees applied to the respondents. Basically, the Court found that
the discrimination in favor of the United States which arose from the terms of the
agreement involved, was not a violation of the fifth amendment. 315 U.S. at 228.
38. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8; id. art. II, §§ 2-3; id. art. III, §§1-3.
39. L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 40.
40. See 40 CONG. REC. 1475-80 (1906).
41. Q. WRiGHT, THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922).
42. Id. at 8, 399.
43. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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plicitly dealt with it in the subsequent United States v. Belmont44
and Pink cases.
A. Sutherland's "Inherent Power" Argument: Implications, Criticism
In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of
a congressional delegation of power to the President to prohibit arms
sales to countries involved in hostilities in the Chaco, and enunciated
as dicta the "inherent power" doctrine, which postulates that the Presi-
dent has the authority to make executive agreements 4 by virtue of
the office he holds, even though such power is not explicitly granted
to him in the Constitution. Justice Sutherland, on behalf of the ma-
jority, argued that the power to make agreements which are not
treaties vests in the federal government as a concomitant to sover-
eignty.46 The President as the "sole organ" of the government in foreign
affairs therefore has the "inherent power" to make such agreements. 7
This dicta was apparently the first judicial approach to delineating
the limits which separation of powers placed upon the executive agree-
ment.
The Belmont and Pink cases gave the Supreme Court the op-
portunity to reexamine Sutherland's analysis, and in both cases the
executive agreement at issue was identical. The President had entered
into a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union which resulted in
United States' recognition of the Soviet government in 1933. One of
the documents involved was an executive agreement known as the
Litvinov Assignment in which the President agreed to assignment to
the United States of claims which the Soviets had held against the
United States.48 In the Belmont case, the basic issue was the domestic
legal effect of this self-executing executive agreement, whose terms
conflicted with a state policy. The Court found that such agreements
were the "law of the land," overriding conflicting state laws or
policies49 To reach this decision the Court examined the President's
44. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
45. Since Justice Sutherland did not distinguish between self-executing and non
self-executing agreements, it is assumed that his comments applied to the former as
well as the latter.
46. 299 U.S. at 318.
47. Id.
48. See 28 Am. J. INT'L L. 10-11 (Supp. 1934).
49. 301 U.S. at 331, 332.
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legal authority to make such agreements without congressional au-
thorization, relying upon and restating the Curtiss-Wright argument
that the President, as "sole organ," had the "inherent power" to make
such agreements. 50 When the Court was confronted with basically
the same issue five years later in United States v. Pink,51 Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, merely quoted the Belmont de-
cision.
However, there are some troublesome problems presented by the
"inherent power" argument. In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland de-
rived the President's legal authority to make executive agreements
from the international law notion of the concomitants to sovereignty
which inure to the federal government. However, the issue for pres-
ent purposes is not delineation of the whole federal government's
functions which are derived from sovereignty, but rather the manner
in which such functions were distributed amongst the various branches
of the government by the sovereign itself. Thus, Sutherland's argu-
ment did not reach the separation of powers issue because it did not
deal with the bounds of executive power vis-a-vis Congress, or for that
matter the judiciary. Furthermore, according to the Sutherland argu-
ment, the authority to make executive agreements is not only "in-
herent," but also "plenary,' 52 implying that the President has
"plenary" legislative, or quasi-legislative, authority. Although one
should not approach separation of powers problems with an inflexible
conception of sharply drawn divisions between branches, especially
in the foreign affairs field, attribution of plenary legislative power
to the President would seem to be going too far. The rather extreme
position to which this could lead was vividly illustrated by the gov-
ernment's argument on the district court level in the Steel Seizure
case. 53 The government contended that while the Constitution limited
the exercise of the legislative power granted to Congress, it did not
so limit the exercise of powers granted to the President.54 The Steel
Seizure decision apparently was a rejection of the concept of "in-
herent" presidential power in most peacetime domestic situations, with
that concept's concomitant attribution of "plenary" power to the
50. Id. at 330.
51. 315 U.S. at 203.
52. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
53. A. WESTIN, THnE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE 64 (1958).
54. Id.
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President.5 5 However, this case is not really on point regarding separa-
tion of powers limitations on executive agreements because it con-
cerned a presidentially mandated seizure of the nation's steel mills
and not a presidential exercise of quasi-legislative power on the do-
mestic plane which was interrelated, through an executive agreement,
with the conduct of foreign affairs. Yet, some of the comments in
the Steel Seizure case do furnish valuable aids in approaching the
separation of powers problem presented by self-executing executive
agreements.
B. An Alternative Approach to the Problem: "The Jackson Model"
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case,
although not specifically addressed to the domestic impact of the ex-
ercise of presidential power in foreign affairs, nevertheless is a useful
guide in examining the separation of powers problem. Since Jack-
son's opinion implied that the President may have quasi-legislative
powers, it is directly related to the problem of defining presidential
authority to make self-executing executive agreements. Justice Jack-
son outlined three ways the President could exert quasi-legislative
authority: he may act pursuant to congressional authorization;50 he
may exert independent authority in the absence of a congressional
grant or denial of authority;5 7 and finally, he may exercise his quasi-
legislative authority contrary to congressional will. According to Jack-
son's analysis, the President's authority is weakest in the latter situa-
tion.58
The Jackson approach avoids a rigid conceptualization of separa-
tion of powers and provides for areas in which Congress and the Presi-
-dent share authority to act.59 Moreover, it postulates that there are
areas in which the President has authority to act independently, al-
though in some such areas his authority may be superceded by that of
55. See Note, The Year of the Steel Case, 66 HARv. L. REV. 99, 103 (1952).
56. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
57. Id. at 637.
58. Id. at 637, 638.
59. This refers to Jackson's second category in which the President may act if
-Congress has manifested no desire to act regarding the matter in question. See id. at
c637.
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Congress.60 In a sense, Justice Jackson's analysis raises more problems
than it resolves because it does not identify what the President's
quasi-legislative powers are, nor does it indicate the specific constitu-
tional sources of such powers. Although "the Jackson model" serves as a
useful guide in approaching separation of powers problems, it does
not offer a definition of the power to make self-executing executive
agreements.
C. The "Independent"61 Executive Powers
The separation of powers limitations upon the President's au-
thority to make self-executing executive agreements might be inferred
from certain constitutional grants of power to the President. Es-
sentially, there are four constitutional provisions which may be used
as the legal pegs upon which to hang "independent" presidential
authority: the "executive power" clause; 62 the "Commander in Chief"
clause;61 the clause authorizing the President to receive foreign am-
bassadors;6 4 and the clause directing the President to execute the
laws. 5
1. The "Executive Power" Clause. One might argue that the
"executive power" given the President in article II of the Constitution
implies the power to make self-executing agreements. However, this
interpretation of the "executive power" clause does not accord with
the framers' intent. Although the "executive" was not defined in the
Constitution, the debates in the state ratifying conventions indicate
that the framers referred to the President as "executive" in the sense
of executor of the laws which Congress would pass.66
60. Even in Justice Jackson's second category of "concurrent authority" the
President has some "independent" power to act. If this were not so, in the face of con-
gressional inertia the President would not be able to take any action.
61. With the possible exception of the President's authority to insure the safety
of troops and personnel abroad, it is preferable to place quotation marks around the
word "independent" because, in fact, the broad range of congressional legislative jusris-
diction might also give Congress competency in these areas. See notes 94-95 infra &
accompanying text.
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
63. Id. § 2.
64. Id. § 3.
65. Id. Actually, this power is merely a result of the powers derived from sections
one and two of article II. Thus, only if the President has any quasi-legislative authority
to make law will his power to execute the laws be meaningful.
66. Berger, supra note 7, at 19-20.
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2. "Commander in Chief." Defining the Commander in Chief's
powers presents a difficult problem since they have been advanced as
the legal authority for some of the more significant 7 and controver-
sial"" executive agreements in the past. The basic test which will reveal
if an activity falls within the Commander in Chief power is whether
such activity is directly related to the conduct of military affairs. The
Commander in Chief clause gives the President legal authority to make
self-executing agreements pertaining to exchange of personnel for the
purposes of good will, military instruction, visitations by ranking offi-
cers, exchange of information, advances in military technique, and
providing necessary support facilities which do not fall within Congress'
legislative jurisdiction. 69 All of these activities seem to fall well within
the functions of a commander in chief.
Problems arise as presidential activity becomes less directly re-
lated to military conduct. During the Korean War, United States forces
were engaged in combat despite the fact that war had not been de-
clared by Congress. In the Steel Seizure case the Supreme Court held
that the Commander in Chief power did not legally support govern-
ment seizure of privately owned steel mills to insure continued produc-
tion relying upon the fact that the United States was not within the
theater of war.70 This decision means that the Commander in Chief's
powers will not support peacetime seizure of privately owned factories
necessary to the armed forces: yet it does not prohibit the President
from making self-executing agreements concerning supply of United
States forces. For example, since Congress controls expenditures, the
President cannot make a self-executing agreement which obligates the
United States to pay money. However, if the United States' obligation
in an agreement is to acquaint the other nation party to that agree-
ment with our military technology, the Commander in Chief clause
seems to be sufficient authority for that agreement.
When the safety of American troops and support personnel is
immediately imperiled, the exercise of presidential quasi-legislative
power to avert the perceived danger is supported by the Commander
67. E.g., 39 Op. ATTY GEN. 484 (1940) (concerning the famous destroyers-for-
bases deal with Great Britain).
68. See e.g., Hearings on Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 7, 8, 10 (1972); 66
STATE DEP'T BULL. 279, 282 (1972).
69. See note 70 supra & accompanying text.
70. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
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in Chief clause. Such power is exercised in order to keep United States
forces intact, maintenance of striking forces intact being one of the
military tasks which devolve upon commanders. For example, had an
immediate and massive troop evacuation from Viet Nam been neces-
sary, and military shipping facilities inadequate, the Commander in
Chief clause would probably have served as sufficient legal authority
to support federalization of private shipping within the Pacific to effect
the evacuation. A self-executing agreement with the same effect, pos-
sibly in the context of an ad hoc joint evacuation agreement with an-
other nation, would also derive domestic legal validity from the
Commander in Chief clause.
The test of direct relation to military activity which is used to
determine if an act falls within the scope of the Commander in Chief
power is a rather crude one. It becomes more so as the military's capa-
bilities extend into "civilian" activities such as flood control. Until
challenged, the Commander in Chief clause appears to have the po-
tential to support a wide variety of presidential action, and therefore
self-executing agreements. With one exception (commitment of United
States troops to combat abroad) ,'7 there is no legal definition of the
Commander in Chief's powers; apparently the only way in which the
issue will be resolved is through further legislation or a series of
judicial decisions.
3. The "Receive" Clause. In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton
considered the clause authorizing the President to "receive" foreign
ambassadors more "a matter of dignity than authority," 72 referring only
to a situation in which an ambassador from a specific government was
replacing his immediate predecessor, rather than the many others in
which certain powers stem from the function of receiving ambassadors.
The "receive" clause is suceptible of interpretation supporting presi-
dential powers to act as the nation's sole official organ of communica-
tion with other governments, the power to recognize governments, and
a more general "foreign affairs" power. The outstanding issue is the
extent to which, as a matter of necessity, the authority to make self-
executing agreements is derived from the "receive" clause.
Since the President is the "sole organ" of 6fficial communication
with other nations, he has authority to conduct foreign relations and
71. See Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 468 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
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make international agreements. When he enters into an international
agreement it becomes part of international law; and, in the absence of
prior treaty or other controlling domestic legislation, international
law becomes law of the land.73 Thus, when domestic law has not dealt
with the subject matter of a proposed agreement in a controlling man-
ner, it can be argued that the President derives the power to make a
self-executing agreement from his authority to make international
agreements. However, the constitutional investiture of Congress with
certain enumerated powers implicitly denies the President authority
to act without congressional sanction in areas which these powers cover.
Subject matter covered by such powers has been dealt with in the
"controlling" fashion which precludes incorporation of international
law into domestic law and effectively denies the President authority
-to make self-executing agreements regarding that subject matter. Some
scholars have been particularly disturbed by this argument 4 because
as a consequence Congress lays claim to legislative competence in so
broad an area that little, if any, territory remains in which the Presi-
dent could make a self-executing agreement without congressional
sanction. There have been no Supreme Court decisions on this issue,
and the lower courts have passed upon it during different eras with
different results. In 1953, during the furor over the Bricker Amend-
ment,75 the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,70
invalidated an executive agreement with Canada which allowed the
importation of Canadian potatoes. One of the grounds for the court's
decision was that regulation of foreign commerce lay exclusively within
Congress' legislative jurisdiction77 thus precluding self-executing execu-
tive agreements in this area without congressional sanction. From this
decision one might infer that the President may not make self-executing
agreements in areas covered by Congress' enumerated powers. Yet, a
more recent decision reveals different judicial treatment of the issue. In
Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers,78 the District Court for the
District of Columbia invalidated an executive agreement concerning
foreign steel companies' restrictions on their exports into the United
States because part of that agreement appeared to promise these com-
73. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
74. E.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 181.
75. See note 7 supra & accompanying text.
76. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.), af'd, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
77. 204 F.2d at 658.
78. 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973).
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panies immunity from antitrust prosecution within the United States.7
In order to invalidate this agreement, which also concerned foreign
commerce, the court could have rested its decision upon the earlier
Capps opinion. Instead the court presumed that the President did have
some "independent authority" over regulation of foreign commerce
(an enumerated power) because of its connection with the conduct of
foreign affairs.8 0 The court's presumption might indicate an inclina-
tion to concede some quasi-legislative power to the President in the
foreign commerce field. At this time, however, the issue remains un-
settled and will remain so until Congress defines the so-called "foreign
affairs power"81 of the President, or until the Supreme Court satisfac-
torily disposes of the issue.
The power to recognize foreign governments may also form the
basis for imputation to the President of quasi-legislative authority
enabling him to make certain self-executing agreements. In the Pink
decision, the President's authority to make a self-executing agreement
rested upon Sutherland's "inherent powers" doctrine, but reference
was also made to the President's power to recognize governments. Jus-
tice Douglas, writing for the majority, emphasized that the terms
of the executive agreement at issue were part of a larger recognition
transaction. He wrote that:
Power to remove obstacles to recognition such as settlement of claims
of our nationals . . . certainly is a modest implied power of the
President who is "sole organ!' of the federal government in interna-
tional relations.8 2
The question such dicta raises is whether authority to make self-execut-
ing agreements which remove domestic legal obstacles to recognition
necessarily derives from the presidential power to recognize foreign
governments.
The argument that the power to recognize implies authority to
remove all obstacles which domestic law might pose to recognition
overreaches the mark for the result of such an argument would be in-
vestment of the President with plenary quasi-legislative power.83 A
79. Id. at 1323.
80. Id.
81. Congress could use the same legal approach it did in the definition of "war
powers." See generally Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
82. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (emphasis added).
83. If the President had the authority to remove all domestic legal obstacles, for
example, it would mean that he had the power to promise not to apply fifth amend-
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more defensible position would be to assert that if recognition neces-
sarily entails certain domestic legal consequences, the power to recog-
nize only engenders presidential authority to remove legal obstacles to
such consequences taking place. According to our domestic law, recog-
nition will result in the recognized state's obtaining the right to appear
and bring suit in our courts,8 4 investment of title to that nation's assets
within the United States in the state recognized as representing it,0 and
in the grant of certain immunities to that state's diplomats whose cre-
dentials have been received by our government."" Conceivably, then, the
President might, along with recognition, make a self-executing agree-
ment the terms of which would essentially remove domestic legal ob-
stacles to these events taking place.
The Pink case is instructive not merely because a recognition
transaction was involved, but also because the executive agreement in
question was a settlement of international claims. Generally, the in-
ternational claims which the United States settles with other nations
are those of United States nationals against foreign governments aris-
ing from actions of those governments outside United States juris-
diction. When the President waives or surrenders such claims, con-
version of the international settlement into domestic law poses little
problem because domestic law did not originally recognize these
claims. Such settlements are part of international law and the absence
of controlling domestic legal action regarding their subject matter
allows them to become incorporated into United States law.87 As a mat-
ter of domestic law then, it appears that the President may make self-
executing agreements waiving the claims of United States nationals
against other nations."8 A different situation is presented, however,
when the President negotiates a claims settlement resulting in acquisi-
tion of property by the United States. An agreement acquiring prop-
erty can only be self-executing to the extent that it vests title to the
property in the United States, because once title has vested in the
United States, it is Congress which has control over its disposal.89
ment protections to the citizens of a nation which wanted recognition, but found the
principles inherent in the fifth amendment offensive.
84. 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 674 (1963).
85. 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAl, LAW 387 (1940).
86. 22 U.S.C. §§ 252-54 (1970).
87. See notes 73-74 supra & accompanying text.
88. 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 84, at 1216-19.
89. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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The courts have also apparently been willing to concede some
quasi-legislative authority to the President in the field of sovereign
immunitiesY0 It appears that the courts' willingness to concede quasi-
legislative power to the President in this area was based upon an im-
putation of a general "foreign affairs power" to that office which justi-
fied intrusions into certain areas of domestic law.91 It is uncertain
whether the courts will continue to be so accommodating to the execu-
tive branch in view of the Supreme Court's failure, in Zschernig v.
Miller92 to follow the suggestion of one executive department regard-
ing the effect of a state inheritance law upon United States foreign
relations. Moreover, there may also be a trend towards judicial inde-
pendence of State Department determinations regarding whether the
Act of State defense will apply in specific cases in United States
courts.
9 3
Whether one may interpret the "receive" clause so as to impute a
general "foreign affairs power" to the President enabling him to make
self-executing agreements in many areas is a question which remains
unsettled. It appears that the specific areas in which the President
possesses sufficient quasi-legislative authority upon which to rest a self-
executing agreement in the absence of congressional sanction, are few
and rather narrowly defined. The "receive" clause furnishes the legal
authority for the President to settle international claims (as "sole
organ"), and might furnish sufficient legal authority for the President
to conclude a self-executing agreement which removed the obstacles to
domestic legal consequences of recognition. The Commander in Chief
clause presently gives legal validity to agreements of a military nature,
as well as to certain extraordinary agreements concerning the safety of
United States troops.
90. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). State Department suggestions to
grant immunity have generally been followed, although one should note that the De-
partment has been hesitant to make such suggestions. See L. HENKIN, supra note 2,
at 63-64.
91. See generally Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943).
92. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). It should be noted that in Zschernig the Court de-
clined to follow a suggestion put forward by the Department of Justice rather than
one the State Department proposed. However, this is not to say that one department's
suggestion necessarily carries more weight in the courts.
93. See Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432-33, 436 (1964);
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco National de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 774-75 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ; id. at 777, 778, 787-88, 790-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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D. "Concurrent Powers"
A question which remains largely unanswered is whether the
President may make self-executing agreements under the "receive"
clause in areas where the Congress has waived legislative jurisdiction
and the President has quasi-legislative authority to act04 A strict con-
struction of the Constitution would require that the enumerated powers
of article I remain exclusively in Congress' realm. A more flexible
reading of the Constitution, allowing the President authority to make
self-executing agreements in areas of congressional competency, still
would not assign to the President quasi-legislative authority wholly
autonomous of Congress. The rather broad area of legislative jurisdic-
tion to which Congress may lay claim would seem to compel the con-
clusion that even -when the President has quasi-legislative authority
over certain domestic matters because of their relation to foreign
affairs, that authority is concurrent to that of Congress As a matter
of domestic law, this means it would either be pursuant to congres-
sional will or that in the face of congressional inertia the President
would be enabled to make a self-executing executive agreement.
Some of the specific quasi-legislative powers the President derives
from the "receive" clause are also conceivably susceptible to congres-
sional limitation. Congress' powers over United States courts may
be the basis for congressional legislative claim to delineating the conse-
quences of recognition of another state in terms of that state's status
before those courts. This would also give Congress authority to legis-
late regarding sovereign immunity if it so desires.07 Congress' foreign
commerce powers98 could conceivably furnish it with the legal authority
to pass legislation delineating the shape of claims settlements by the
President with other nations. Thus, although the President may claim
quasi-legislative authority in specific areas based upon constitutional
94. The courts have shown themselves to be undecided upon this issue when the
subject matter upon which presidential quasi-legislative authority is to be exercised is
related to foreign affairs. As the authors of the two most eminent treatises on the
foreign affairs powers of the President have pointed out, it is not always the constitu-
tional argument which disposes of the issue. Compare Q. WRioHT, supra note 41, at
336 with L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 122.
95. L. HBENKIN, supra note 2, at 181-84.
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
97. E.g., S. Res. 566, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 119 CoNG. R C.
1298 (1973).
98. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
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provisions, this authority seems limited to the extent that Congress
has clearly expressed its will regarding the subject matter in question.99
This hypothesis is rather appealing because it allows the President
authority to shape domestic law consonant with his international
agreements in areas where congressional acts are not intended as the
exclusive mode of dealing with a particular problem on the domestic
level, however it also accords Congress the ultimate authority to shape
domestic legislation, and thus leaves that body free to check the ac-
tions of the President. Only time will tell whether the courts actually
will adopt this hypothesis as a legal proposition.
III. DOMESTIC LEGAL STATUS OF SELF-EXECUTING EXECUTIvE
AGREEMENTS IN THE FACE OF CONFLICTING STATUTES
In some cases the terms of a self-executing agreement may come
into direct conflict with a prior federal statute in an area which has
been considered one of concurrent power. 100 For this to occur, it would
be necessary for a court to employ the conception of separation of
powers which allows for legislative overlap between Congress and the
President in certain matters related to foreign affairs. Were such a con-
ception used, it would appear that if Congress had manifested its intent
to make the prior statute the exclusive mode of dealing with a particu-
lar problem, 01 presidential action would be preempted by that of
Congress and the terms of the executive agreement would have no do-
mestic legal effect. Where prior statutes do not exist, or do not express
Congress' intent to preempt the field, the terms of a self-executing
agreement may be given effect as domestic law. However, Congress
always retains the option to override such action by passing an appro-
priate statute which would also preempt any further executive action
in the area. As domestic law, the self-executing executive agreement is
similar to, but not identical with, the treaty. Whereas the treaty may
99. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
with Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (D.D.C.
1973).
100. In the Capps case the regulation of foreign commerce was considered to be
exclusively Congress' power.
101. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
with Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (D.D.C.
1973).
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deal with any matter of international concern,'102 the self-executing
executive agreement without congressional sanction may only deal
with those domestic matters which have not conclusively been handled
by Congress. Thus, the self-executing executive agreement is a bit
less "supreme" than the treaty when confronted with prior conflicting
federal statutes.
The status of a self-executing agreement in the face of conflict-
ing state policies and statutes would be at issue only if it had already
been determined that the agrement was valid in terms of the general
prohibitions limiting federal action 0 3 and the separation of powers
limitations upon the President. The Belmont and Pink decisions estab-
lished that valid self-executing executive agreements are "supreme
law," overriding inconsistent state law and policy. 0 4 The courts have
not questioned these decisions, but the State Department apparently
doubts that they will stand for long. In its proposed alteration of
executive agreement procedures, the Department notes that one of the
factors to be considered when deciding whether to consummate busi-
ness with another nation in the form of an executive agreement is
whether that agreement would conflict with state laws or policies. 10
As a matter of law, in view of Belmont and Pink, this consideration
would seem superfluous; yet, it makes a good deal of political sense in
an era in which presidential power, rightly or wrongly, is being as-
sailed.
IV. CONCLUSION
According to our domestic law, the self-executing executive agree-
ment exists as an alternative to the treaty in making international
agreements. Those limitations applicable to exercise of the treaty
making power, such as the Bill of Rights and certain guarantees to
the states, apply to the executive agreement as well. The most difficult
limitations to comprehend are those engendered by the separation of
powers principle. One may deny that, in the absence of congressional
102. W. BIsHoP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (3d ed. 1971).
103. See notes 24-26 supra & accompanying text.
104. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1936); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942).
105. Proposed Revision of Foreign Affairs Manual, ch. 721, § 3(a)(ii), 38 Fed.
Reg. 22085 (1973).
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sanction, the President has any authority to make self-executing agree-
ments because possession of such authority would mean he has the
legislative authority which the Constitution grants solely to Congress.
This argument is rarely used because it rests upon an inflexible con-
ception of separation of powers which has generally been rejected as
analytically unworkable. Alternatively, one might construe certain
constitutional provisions as granting the President authority to make
self-executing agreements, but only with respect to certain narrowly
defined subject matter.1 6 Further, one might interpret the "receive"
clause as a grant to the President of authority to make self-executing
agreements by reference to his "legislative" role in the formation of
international law and the subsequent incorporation of that law into
United States law in the absence of prior controlling domestic legal
action.10 7 Yet, even under this most expansive view of presidential
authority Congress holds the upper hand, always retaining the option
of pre-empting presidential quasi-legislative action by enacting an
appropriate statute (or some other unequivocal expression of its legis-
lative will) .108 Presently, the shape of presidential authority to make
self-executing agreements remains rather vague, but it nevertheless
appears that when the courts or Congress face this issue its resolution
will most probably follow the outline of either of the two latter
approaches.
There have been only six noteworthy cases regarding presidential
authority to make executive agreements, 0 9 and the only statute con-
cerning this subject specifically sought to avoid difficult constitutional
issues." 0 However, the courts or Congress may soon find themselves
compelled to deal more extensively with these issues. There has been
recent discussion ab6ut the possibility of settling United States claims
against the People's Republic of China in order to open up trade
between our two nations through a self-executing agreement similar
106. See notes 61-93 supra & accompanying text.
107. See notes 73-74 supra & accompanying text.
108. An example of "unequivocal expression" by Congress of its will might consist
of a legislative history indicating the intent behind the defeat of a particular statute.
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
109. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1936); United States v. Guy W. Capps,
Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953); Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F.
Supp., 1319 (D.D.C. 1973); Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 610 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
110. 1 U.S.C. § 112(b) (Supp. II, 1972); S. REP. No. 591, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
3-5 (1972).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to the Litvinov Assignment of 1933. The recent spate of criticism
of presidential usage of the executive agreement would probably
mean that a decision to consummate such a transaction would precipi-
tate a congressional-executive confrontation which the President would
be well-advised to avoid. If a decision to settle claims with China
through a self-executing executive agreement is made, we might ex-
pect certain elements in Congress to initiate a legislative effort to de-
fine and limit the scope of the executive agreement power. We may
also expect cases in the courts contesting the legality of such an agree-
ment. One should remain wary of possible judicial or congressional
overreaction to arguments that the President is usurping congressional
power under the guise of conducting foreign relations. At the same
time, however, one may look forward to possible congressional or judi-
cial activity as the start of the resolution of the unsolved separation of
powers problem posed by the practice of concluding self-executing
executive agreements.
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